In terms of global colonialism, we forget that North America is still a post-colonial region. Take the message of this link as one set of proof (and add it to other sets of proof, like the treatment of indigenous peoples).

Orientalism, in the sense that I will be using it throughout my analysis, refers to a systemic discursive regime—a way of thinking, speaking and thus acting—that reifies a distinction between East and West, Orient and Occident, that perpetuates a hierarchy privileging the West. This usage of term was conceived by Edward Said in Orientalism.  As Said argues:

Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority for the Orient. (1978, 3)

Said then explains that he is employing Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse. Some have argued that Said problematically veers from Foucault in ways that weaken his argument. Nonetheless, the notion of a systemic regime of discourse is undoubtedly Foucauldian. A systemic regime is the sum of all the ways in which we communicate, in various media and contexts, a limited range of possible ways of understanding some topic. That is, a discursive regime is the possibilities of which we are given the tools to think about a subject; it also includes the fact that when we do act  or communicate we contribute to those possibilities. Orientalism, as a discursive regime, is particularly related to the manner in which we understand the Orient. For Said, this notion of discourse is fundamental to his critical project: “My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systemic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient…” (3).

Fundamental to Orientalism is the binary between East and West. Part of Said’s argument is that while, for example, India and China historically saw themselves as the center of the world because of colonialism the West had the power to construct and impose a binary that relegated all non-European based cultures as East, as Other. This was often not a consciously purposeful construction, but in sum, it became a standard basis for understanding the world. As such, the colonial and post-colonial periods have been dominated by the Orient/Occident binary, even if it continues in terms like First World/Third World.

Foucault’s understanding of power/knowledge, when applied to Orientalism by Said, gives us insight into how this developed. The European imagining of an East and West served its own purposes of self-definition. In order for Europe to imagine itself it imagined what it was not. The increasingly global awareness of colonial knowledge provided much fruit for this project, culminating in the Orient as West’s Other. The Orient or the East was constructed to be a foil that was the opposite of how the West wanted to imagine itself. That being said, it was not the case that this was a necessarily conscious and homogenous construct: there was a wide variety of concerns and opinions, some appreciative of the East, some not.

But, by the 19^th century one could rarely think outside of the East/West binary, and all the connected understandings that come with the binary. Each pole of the dyad has its own associations. The West was rational, materialistic, civilized, masculine, scientific, modern, individualistic, active, dynamic—and conceived of as Self. The East was irrational, spiritual, savage, feminine, exotic, mysterious, traditional, communal, passive, unchanging—Other. Individual European and non-European thinkers may have occasionally stepped outside of this understanding, but in sum the patterns of Orientalist thought follow these associations. The hierarchies between these associated binaries privilege the West. Even in the case of Romanticist leanings towards the East or anti-colonial resistance to colonization, this set of binary associations generally remained the unchallenged episteme through which people thought.

The more people expressed themselves in relation to this set of binaries, the more epistemic weight these binaries possessed. This could only happen because of power of Europe to impose (not just by material force but perhaps more powerfully by imaginative force) itself and its understanding on or about the Orient: “The scientist, the scholar, the missionary, the trader, or the soldier was in, or thought about, the Orient because he [sic] could be there, or could think about it, with very little resistance on the Orient’s part” (7; emphasis in the original). Many contemporary scholars have emphasized how little indigenous agency plays a part in Said’s analysis, and to a certain degree I sympathize with their criticisms. Nonetheless, indigenous elites, often trained in or heavily exposed to the European episteme, frequently thought in Orientalist ways themselves. The positive nature of the critique of Orientalism is an awareness that this critique lays bare the manner in which the construction of knowledge is put into service by and contributes to political action. Orientalism is a discourse whose underlying political movement is to characterize the Orient in a manner that allows the West to not only define itself as superior to the East, but to facilitate ready and favourable ways of dealing with the East based on these characterizations.

All this being said, aside from this general picture of Orientalism as a systemic discourse, we can identify certain strategies of interpretation that contribute to Orientalism. The 19^th century showed the crystallization of Orientalism as a construction of Self and Other, but also laid the foundation for many of the ways that we think about East/West today.

As a matter of course, whenever we reify the distinction between East and West, we contribute to the underlying structural framework wherein the West is constructed as the centerpoint, the locus, for all subsequent distinctions. Any use this binary is indebted to the nineteenth-century construction of the imagined Orient as somehow Other to the West as Self. In the nineteenth century, the West was Europe; the Orient was in many ways a stand-in for the rest of the world. It is the connection of this discourse to colonial power that had such far-reaching global and temporal consequences.

As the volume, Orientalism and the Post-colonial Predicament, by Breckenridge and van der Veer points out, colonials often readily accepted these characterizations and reframed them as sites for anti-colonial, nationalist, or even, in the case of Japan, their own colonial endeavors. With post-colonialism, these essentializations, structures and institutions taken up by colonials remains, naturalized. In 1993, the authors coined this the Post-colonial predicament:  “decolonization does not entail immediate escape from colonial discourse [which]… defines both the ex-colonizer and the ex-colonized” (2). As many contemporary theorists have expressed, the assumption of essential qualities in regards to culture or human nature is a strategy. Its productive effect is to provide a basis for policing and disciplining deviations from the essence as abnormalities (disregarding the objection that the very existence of some deviation from the essence refutes the notion of essence taken as universal).

This essentialization has been explored by thinkers such as Franz Fanon and Homi Bhabha. In Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, the fact of blackness becomes an embodied, and internalized conflict of the external fact of white essentialization of the black man: “And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. An unfamiliar weight bore on me. .. As I began to recognize the symbol of sin, I catch myself hating the Negro. But then I recognize that I am Negro” (Fanon, 1952: 325). He later, in his The Wretched of the Earth, notes this process of post-colonial internalization of colonial understandings in the figure of the colonized intellectual:

The colonialist bourgeoisie, in its narcissistic dialogue, expounded by the members of its universities, had in fact deeply implanted in the minds of the colonized intellectual that the essential qualities remain eternal in spite of all the blunders men may make: the essential qualities of the West, of course. The native intellectual accepted the cogency of these ideas, and deep down in his brain you could always find a vigilant sentinel ready to defend the Greco-Latin pedestal. (46)

The double consciousness (to use De Bois’ famous phrasing) of colonized subjectivity it at once a consciousness of the self and a consciousness of the colonizing other—always being aware of the gaze of the colonizer. However, after decolonization, an unconscious or structural reflection of this double consciousness remains.

In an analysis of this phenomenon in India, Ashis Nandy’s The Intimate Enemy explores the psychological effects of colonialism on the colonized and post-colonial subject. He argues that the colonization is most powerfully a product of the mind, and decolonization is the process of resisting internalized colonial structures of thought. He says:

This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to  bodies and it  releases forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once for all. In the process, it helps  generalize the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to  a psychological category. The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures and in minds. (1983: xi)

Homi Bhabha (1994) takes up theses insights about the colonized mind and argues that this internalization of colonial consciousness is a site of mimicry, irony and subversion. His analysis too involves the process of a decolonization of the mind. That is, in terms of Orientalism, the internalized projection of the colonial image of the Oriental is a farce where the post-colonial subject can use this internalized image as a site of play to resist, mock and ironically destabilize the remnants of the post-colonial predicament on the subject.

In conclusion, post-colonial thinkers today tend to attempt a kind of epistemic de-colonization or a structural critique of the post-colonial predicament in order to develop strategies that resist the remnants of colonization. Decolonization does not just end at independence. Decolonization is still ongoing, and I would argue, with many others (e.g. Negri and Hardt), that as long as there remains a Western dominated global politico-economic hegemony, decolonization will remain an fundamental task of justice.

His latest film’s premise is to take a “man off the streets” and train him to be a faith healer. The sensational climax is when this ‘faith healer’ “passes” as a faith healer in Dallas, Texas. Throughout the film Derren plays up the notion of faith healing as a scam and to “debunk it”, framing this as a moral issue of revealing scam artists.

You can see a clip here.

While Watching this film, it has come to me that this would be a perfect film to address to a 4th year or graduate seminar class about the nature of the discipline of Religious Studies. I would ask the students what is the first thing that comes to mind or what they might think about the show–framing their answers to be as if they were a response by a professional academic of Religious Studies. I predict a number of responses from students that I would take issue with. And I would want to fail them for all of these responses.

I predict students might agree with Derren Brown, and argue the veracity of the religious claims to fail healing. I bet some students would be offended by the film or some how become defensive about faith healing. I predict some students might chime in about the moral implications of the show, from whatever perspective.

To all of these responses I would want to fail the students. These positions are not the purview of a religious studies scholar. These  responses are not critically aware or self-reflexive enough to encapsulate a very nuanced understanding of religion (whatever that is).

More interesting responses might be answering questions like:

• How does the ideological agenda of the Derren Brown film mimic the subject it is critical of? How is Derren Brown doing anything different? Is his position not just as ideological (thus “religious”) as the faith healer?
• What techniques does Derren Brown use to debunk the target of his shows that he also uses on the audience watching the show?
• He is often referencing a kind of moral superiority to build the sympathy of his audience. What purpose does this serve?

Note the difference in these questions. These questions avoid become inmeshed in the narratives of either faith healing or Derren Brown’s skepticism. These questions attempt to understand the meaning-laden narrative that Derren Brown builds as much as that of faith healing. This is not a matter of taking a “two sides to every issue” response. Rather, it is a matter of applying the same techniques and perspective to every angle of a situation.

If we get caught in the narrative that Derren Brown weaves, we lose self-critical awareness. The same could be said for faith healing.  Whatever critical skills we learn, we must apply those to our own ideological positions and belief systems as much as anything else. Otherwise, we are as guilty of whatever sin our subject matter is committing as they are. Otherwise, we are shilling sub-standard product. Otherwise, we are as much charlatans and propagandists as those we are critical of. Is that really the job of an academic?

This, of course, is a trick question.

How should we analyze Derren Brown’s Miracles For Sale?

I leave it to the reader to think of an appropriate, professional response to this question. You will be graded.

Zen is a term used widely in North American popular culture to evoke the mystical East, or a sense of calm, or whatever its latest referent is. What is interesting is that this picture was taken in Bangalore, India (2006). If this image was used in North America, we might decry it as the appropriation of the “Other” for the capitalist gain of the “Self”. Instead, we have the appropriation of the “Other Asia” by “Our Asia”. The key elements of orientalism that are reproduced here are stereotypes of the Other as exotic (zen is a major signifier of such), as a symbolic commodity to be capitalized on for is semiotic value, and as a moving signifier to meet the needs of the ‘Self’. What does ‘Xen’ mean here? What does it evoke? The clean, calm lines of modernity? Of minimalism and simplicity? Of mystery and exoticism? How does the ‘X’ change the meaning as opposed to the ‘Z’? Does it signify a cool, hip variant?

Another thing to note is that the second sentence under the word ‘Xen’ is as follows: “More Affordable in economy LATINA series”. Here we see the politics of orientalism/race/gender playing out that contributes to the stereotyping of female hispanics as poor or lesser than. It might contradictorily affirm the attractiveness of the hispanic female–that is, why is it LATINA and not LATINO? Again, we can come back to the analysis that sex is the prime signifier of desire in late capitalism, and sex within patriarchy is inhabited by the male gaze.

This seemingly innocuous image of power switches is embedded in a whole intersection of symbolic meaning and utilizes many stereotypes within discourse to market the product as attractive for consumers who are also consuming this symbolic product.

As some of us know, homosexuality is a recent development. While same-sex love has been around for all of recorded history, its iterations have been many, various and at times even the status quo (I’m looking at you, Ancient Greeks). Homosexuality itself, however, is an invention of a nineteenth-century Europe dedicated to SCIENCE!!!! and the “finding”–pronounced construction–of deviance from a bourgeois, middle-class state-promoted sociology of the nuclear family. This sociology was developed in order to guarantee the subsequent generations of a middle-class educated populace that is the foundation of the modern nation state. For those who like trivia, keep in mind that the term heterosexuality only began to see wide usage in the 1930′s, about 50 years after the invention of the term homosexuality (which, originally meant what we now think of as heterosexuality, with a brief period where it meant what we now think of as bisexuality).

Homosexuality as a term is not some neutral term that just describes the state of affairs of a particular sub-set of people. It is a term that springs from the titillated desire for science to shamelessly catalogue and pruriently search out for hidden deviance with a perverse twinkle in its eye. The term has a complex history that includes its use to discipline and discriminate against those classified as homosexuals. It has also been taken up with pride by those who faced oppression based on the term, and in this strategy there has been some success in the West in ameliorating its rhetorical uses for oppression.

Aside from these elements worthy of note, most important for understanding global homophobia is that at the same time as homosexuality is being constructed as a deviance–not coincidentally–European powers are colonizing the world. The power of Europe to be there (a phrase I take from Edward Said–also note how close this resembles Heidegger’s Dasein, “being-there”) enabled Europe to construct itself as the West, and this in turn affected its own constructions of sexuality. The end product was that most colonial powers brought a new and, for Europeans, important,  legal framework into the colonies: sodomy laws, and laws against homosexuality. For many of these colonized regions (aside from those already impacted by their common connection to Western epistemes, most noteably Islamic regions) these laws criminalizing homosexuality and sodomy were new and entirely innovative procedures of classifying people. For some countries, these laws were minor blips that were paid little attention. For other countries, especially those who were under discursive pressure to fight against the “feminization of the East” that Orientalism so handily lobbed towards them, these laws were quite useful for convincing themselves that they were as masculine as masculine can get.

And here we come up against what is known as the post-colonial predicament. This term was coined by Carol Breckenridge and Van der Veer in their edited volume The Post-Colonial Predicament. What the post-colonial predicament describes is the internalization and naturalization of colonial epistemes, structures and institutions by once colonized peoples. That is, it is when colonized and post-colonized people take once imposed colonial stuctures as if they were their own natural way of doing things.

In order to understand globalized homophobia, we need to understand that in almost all cases (I’m hedging my bets, but note I’ve never seen a counter-example) homophobia in postcolonial regions is precisely an example of the post-colonial predicament. The homophobia of, say Uganda, was a colonial trope that is now coming to fruition as if Uganda has always been against people of alternative sexuality. This is absolutely not the case. And it is not isolated. World-wide, almost every case of homophobia is caused by the remnants of colonialism.

In fact, there is even further transformation of discourse about this. In India, we find a discourse among the right that India has never has same-sex love and that homosexuality is a Western imposition, and that same-sex love is actually Indians pandering to the West as if they are some sort of colonial spy. This makes the right feel good, as it rhetorically situates them as anti-colonial gatekeepers. However, as people like Ruth Vanita and Peter Jackson and others have shown, India has a long long history of alternative sexualities. Indeed, what IS new is the taking up of Western understandings of same-sex love by activists in order to find strategies and global support for fighting DISCRIMINATION. It works both ways. Also note that this discrimination only began because of colonization.

So how do these insights help us? There are many answers to this question, but I would argue that a rhetorical strategy that reversed the Indian right’s strategy would not only hold some element of facticity, but also be quite attractive. I would argue that LGBT activists and the like should start arguing that homophobia is pandering to colonialism. One could even spin it by making material connections between the elites in, say Uganda, and the right of the United States. If homophobic rhetoric in post-colonized countries begins to be associated with colonial cow-towing, the anti-colonial sentiment that still remains a powerful rhetorical device world-wide can be strategically and fruitfully used to shame and counter this homophobic discourse. The key, of course is marketing and the pragmatic concern of being able to penetrate the media etc. with this trope.

Regardless, my sentiments go out to all those globally who have to face oppression based on the convoluted and complex history of homophobia and its rhetorical uses by elites to shore up their own power.

From my own perspective, I find it interesting to ask the question, while watching the slide-show and reading the analysis, ‘to what end do these different views of teen sexuality aim?” That is, what if we take a methodological stance that assumes a teleology and homogeneity to these discourses and consequently wonder what are the goals of talking about teen sexuality in way that they are talked about? Now, of course, we know that discourses are contradictory and there is no homogeneous force shaping them, but taking this stance might offer interesting insight.

In that light, I would argue that the respective discourse about teen sexuality says something about the different attitudes about about teen sexuality in Europe and North America. We see European attitudes being more practical–focused on strategies that accomplish specific goals and attempting to frame representations to meet these practical goals. In North American attitudes, I find the discourse about teen sexuality has very little to do with teen sexuality in and of itself. The goals are similar, but impacting the discourse is a whole set of idealizations and imaginary fictions imputed on the subject. North American attitudes speak to me of this having much more to do with adult fears and dreams than teens themselves. Unfortunately, it leads me to a kind of psychologism where I come to this insight, and thus its corollary: What kinds of of strange nostalgias has led former teens (adults) to construct these elaborate fear-based narratives about their past?

It all seems a little opaque to me, but I find the question an interesting one that I will continue to ruminate on.

A. The exception proves the rule.
or,
B. The exception disproves the rule.

If you believe A. then you can be accused of totalitarian, tyrannical rhetoric.

If you believe B. you can be accused of moral relativism.

Both of these positions are fundamental epistemic ways of experiencing the world around us, and their rebuttals fall within set strategies of discursive resistance. My question is, what makes both A and B possible? What other ways of approaching the world might there be?

Passion frees us from our own limitations and it transforms us. We must be wary of these mutations. Desire takes our passions and shapes us to its own will. Tempering passion, however, risks tainting it; a manageable passion may not be passion at all. Or indeed, it may only be wishful thinking that we can manage passions. Rationalizations atrophy spontaneity–and may be a more firm a cage than our entangling desires.

Instead of all this concern about desires, passions, CONTROL–we should be artisans who are concerned to shape and reshape our prisons. Denial about our own imprisonment is the most sinister trap of all. It is a bolder freedom to step in a trap of our choosing and to tool it into the shape we desire. All other choices mean that we leave other forces to guide our imprisonment. We become beholden to their manufacturing. Let us prefer our own, and decorate them well.

BAM:

One repays a teacher badly if one always remains only a pupil. And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels?

You revere me; but what if your reverence tumbles one day? Beware that a statue does not strike you dead!

You say you believe in Zarathustra? But of what importance is Zarathustra? You are my believers: but of what importance are all believers?

You had not yet sought yourselves: then you found me. Thus do all believers; therefore all faith amounts to so little.

Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you.

- Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra